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CONFLICT OF LAWS-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
JURISDICTION OF COURTS
Martin v. Martin' involved a bill in equity by a wife to set aside
a divorce decree as fraudulently obtained by the husband. The parties
had been domiciled in Pennsylvania. While in Tennessee as a member
of the armed forces the husband obtained the divorce in the state. He
was subsequently transferred outside the United States. Complain-
ant's bill to set the decree aside for fraud was sustained by the
chancellor, defendant being served by publication. Defendant then
made a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the court and
appealed from an adverse ruling.
The Supreme Court held that there was jurisdiction, declaring that
the husband "brought the marriage status into the State of Tennessee,
and thereafter remained beyond the jurisdiction, so unless the State
of Tennessee had jurisdiction to correct the wrong, the appellee would
be without remedy."2
The result seems clearly correct. Though domicile of one of the
parties is regarded as necessary for jurisdiction to grant a divorce,3
the United States Supreme Court has also held that when the re-
spondent enters an appearance the decision as to jurisdiction is binding
on the parties.4 When this is added to the holding in Adam v. Saenger5
that a person who brings suit in a state is thereby subject to personal
jurisdiction of the court in a cross action,6 there should be little diffi-
culty in agreeing that the chancery court in the Martin case had juris-
diction to set the divorce decree aside for fraud.7
In Acuff v. Service Welding & Machine Co.,8 defendants sent a
trailer truck from Louisville, Kentucky, to Knoxville, Tennessee,
loaded with petroleum tanks. Plaintiff sued for injuries sustained
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 292 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. 1956).
2. Id. at 10.
3. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (1942).
4. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1948); Cook v. Cook,
342 U.S. 126 (1951).
5. 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
6. "The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in demanding justice from
the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is
nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for all
purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence. It is the
price which the state may exact as the condition of opening its courts to the
plaintiff." Id. at 67-68.
7. The fact that the divorce decree was granted by the law court and the
bill to set it aside was sustained by the chancery court should not affect the
issue of jurisdiction. -
8. 141 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
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while unloading the truck, claiming that it was improperly loaded.
Service on defendants was had on the secretary of state, and the court
sustained a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
It is now generally recognized that doing an act within a state is
sufficient to give jurisdiction over a person in a suit arising out of
that act,9 and Tennessee would probably have been able to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant here without personal service.
The court found, however, that the state had not established a proce-
dure for exercising jurisdiction by constructive service under the
facts involved. Under the corporation statutes, the sending of a single
vehicle within the state does not amount to "doing business."'1 And
the "nonresident motorist statute"'" was construed as requiring "that
the injury sustained or the accident which occurred must have had
some causal relation to traffic upon a highway or upon premises ac-
cessible to users of the highway."' 2
Pyle v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.13 involved an interesting problem
of personal jurisdiction and the nonresident motorist statute. Plain-
tiffs were injured in an automobile collision in Tennessee. One car
was from Kentucky, driven by Dishman and owned by Johnson. Plain-
tiffs brought suit against both, alleging that Dishman was in Tennessee
on his own business and on the business of Johnson as an agent. Serv-
ice was had under the nonresident motorist statute, but neither de-
fendant appeared to defend and judgments were entered against them.
Executions being issued with returns of nulla bona, the present action
is brought against Johnson's insurance company, which was duly
notified of all proceedings.
Defendant company filed a special plea that Johnson, while tempo-
rarily away from Kentucky, had left the car in the possession of one
Brown, that the latter had loaned it to Dishman for a trip between
points in Kentucky and that Johnson had no relationship with Dish-
man. When defendant sought to introduce evidence to this effect, the
trial court excluded it on the ground that Johnson's liability had been
established in the earlier suit and could not now be collaterally at-
tacked. Judgment therefore went against the defendant, and the
court of appeals affirmed.
The original judgment was held to be binding on Johnson for two
reasons. First, the declaration alleged that Dishman was her agent
and when she "failed to appear and defend after constructive and
9. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 (3d ed. 1949).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-220, 48-918 (1956).
11. Id. § 20-224.
12. 141 F. Supp. at 295. The court cites Ellis v. Georgia Marble Co., 191
Tenn. 299, 232 S.W.2d 45 (1950) as sustaining the holding that improper
packing causing injury on unloading does not come within terms of the
statute.
13. 299 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. App. M.S. (1956).
[VYOL. 10
CONFLICT OF LAWS
actual notice of said suit, we are of the opinion that the judgments of
the plaintiffs therein, after the expiration of 30 days from rendition
thereof, unappealed from, became binding and conclusive on her."'14
Secondly, the statute speaks of "any owner, chauffeur or operator"'15
of the automobile involved, and Johnson was admittedly the owner.
The judgment being binding on Johnson, it was held to be binding
also on her insurance company in the present suit.
Both of the reasons given for holding the original judgment "bind-
ing and conclusive" on Johnson seem too broad. Suppose that Dishman
had stolen the car from Johnson in Kentucky and had the accident in
Tennessee. Should the mere fact that the plaintiff's declaration alleged
that Dishman was her agent require her to appear to deny the allega-
tion when she had done nothing to subject herself to judicial jurisdic-
tion in Tennessee? Similarly, should her ownership of the car be suf-
ficient to give jurisdiction? If there is no jurisdiction over the de-
fendant, the service of notice outside the state will not give validity
to the judgment.16 It would seem that the Tennessee court would
have no jurisdiction and that its attempt to exercise it would be a
violation of due process of law.'7 A collateral attack is allowable to
show lack of jurisdiction.18
It may be that under the facts of the Pyle case itself there was suf-
ficient basis for jurisdiction. If Johnson left the car with Brown, giving
him authority to lend it to Dishman, there are holdings suggesting that
Tennessee might have legislative jurisdiction to impose liability on
Johnson, and the same facts might well have given judicial jurisdic-
tion.19
McCormick v. Brown2 0 involved an action for damage to property
caused by blasting. Both the property damage and the act causing the
injury took place in Georgia, and defendant's plea in abatement was
sustained. It is the majority rule that an action of trespass to real
property is local and will not be entertained in another state. But this
limitation or jurisdiction is a voluntary one and an increasing number
of courts decline to impose it on themselves.
21
Several acts passed during the year make changes in the statutes
providing for constructive process. Thus the statute requiring foreign
insurance companies to appoint the Commissioner of Insurance and
Banking as agent for service of process has been amended to provide
14. Id. at 669.
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (1956).
16. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
17. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
18. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 187 (3d ed. 1949).
19. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 88 A.L.R. 170 (1933); cf. Scheer v. Rockne
Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
20. 297 S.W.2d 91 (Tenn. 1956).
21. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 270-71 (3d ed. 1949).
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that they shall appoint both the commissioner "and his chief deputy."2
'
The nonresident motorist statute has been amended so that the term
nonresident now "includes any person who though a resident of this
state or who was the owner or operator of a motor vehicle properly
registered and licensed under the laws of this state when the motor
vehicle accident or injury occurred, has been absent from the state
of Tennessee for at least thirty days next preceding the day or which
process shall be lodged with the Secretary of State."' ' Another statute
provides for constructive service of process in annulment actions as in
divorce actions.24 A fourth act amends residence requirement in a
divorce action so that only one year instead of two years' residence
of the petitioner is required when the acts complained of were com-
mitted out of the state or the petitioner resided out of the state at
the time.2
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Stephenson v. Stephenson26 raised the question of what law governs
the validity of a marriage. The wife had been divorced from a former
husband in Alabama, the divorce decree forbidding her to marry
again.27 She later moved to Tennessee. She and the present husband
went to Georgia where they married and then returned to Tennessee.
There was no evidence that they went to Georgia to evade the law of
any other state. The court held that the second marriage was valid
since the Alabama restriction was not binding on the wife. This is in
accordance with general law. The Alabama restriction would have
been binding on the wife only if she had been still domiciled there
and had gone to Georgia to evade the restriction and then returned
to Alabama,2 8 and not all states would enforce it even then.
Evans v. Young2 9 involved a slave marriage and the question of
legitimacy. The court correctly held that when a child had been legiti-
mated at the domicile of himself and his parents his status of legitimacy
would be recognized when he came to Tennessee but that when he
died domiciled in Tennessee leaving property here the Tennessee sta-
tutes of descent and distribution would apply.30 The judges differed as
to the proper interpretation of the Tennessee statutes3' but were in
22. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 8, TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-303 (3) (Supp. 1957),
amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-308 (1956).
23. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957. c. 61, TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (Supp. 1957).
24. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 100, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-834 (Supp. 1957).
25. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957. c. 274, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-803 (Supp. 1957).
29. 2Q8 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
27. There was an attack on the validity of the Alabama divorce decree, but
the Tennessee court held that on the basis of Alabama law the decree could
not be held void on collateral attack.
28. See Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305, 2 L.R.A. 703 (1889).
29. 299 S.W.2d 218 (Tenn. 1957).
30. See generally GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 11 (3d ed. 1949).
31. The question was whether TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-302 to -303 (1956), in-
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agreement as to the applicable rule of conflict of laws.
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
Burden of Proof: In Gordon Transports v. Bailey,32 an action was
brought under the Illinois wrongful death statute for an accident which
happened there. The court of appeals reversed a judgment entered
upon a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff had
made no allegation of lack of contributory negligence and had failed
to meet the burden of showing freedom from contributory negligence
on the part of the deceased as required under Illinois law. While mat-
ters of pleading and burdens of proof are usually treated as procedural
and to be governed by the law of the forum, the court held that the
Illinois law in this case involved substance as well and thus should be
held to apply. Many courts would have applied the lex fori in this
case, but there is substantial authority to sustain the holding and
there is much to be said for applying the foreign law whenever it is
likely to affect the outcome of the litigation and the local system will
not be unduly inconvenienced.3
Proof of Foreign Law: The Gordon Transports case also involved
the question of proof of the Illinois law. Under the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act,34 the Tennessee court took judicial notice
of the Illinois law, statutory or common law. Defendant's failure to
plead the foreign law, when he was required to plead specially, might
have prevented his being able to rely on it as a defense. But here the
action was on the Illinois wrongful death statute and lack of contribu-
tory negligence is one of the elements necessary for recovery. Under
the Illinois law the declaration would have been demurrable for fail-
ure to allege this requirement. It was therefore not a matter of defense.
Limitation of Actions: Three curiously overlapping cases involve
the statute of limitations. In Hixon v. Highsmith, and Sigler v.
Youngblood Truck Lines,3 6 the court held that the local statute of limi-
tations is not tolled when the defendant is out of the state if binding
service could be had on him through the Secretary of State.
The Tennessee "borrowing statute" was raised in the Sigler case
and in Fowler v. Herman.3 7 This statute provides that if the statute
of another state in which the case of action accrued has run while the
volving a child of a slave marriage and permitting collateral kindred to inherit
from him as if he were a white person, would apply to a person whose parents
were not domiciled in Tennessee at the time. The majority held that they did
apply.
32. 294 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
33. See Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L. REV. 153
(1944).
34. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-607 (1956).
35. 147 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Tenn. 1957).
36. 149 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Tenn. 1957).
37. 292 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1956).
1.9571
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defendant was a resident thereof, "the bar is equally effective in this
state."38 It was said not to be applicable in Sigler because the defend-
ant was not resident in Kentucky (where the action accrued) for the
period required.39 It was not applied in Fowler to permit "borrowing"
the Alabama statute40 because the plaintiff had procured a summons to
be issued in Tennessee two days before the Tennessee one-year limita-
tion period had run. The summons was returned unexecuted, and
plaintiff took a nonsuit and filed his suit again within one year as per-
mitted by the Tennessee statutes. 41 The Supreme Court held that the
suing out of the summons, rather than the execution, was the com-
mencement of an action and concluded: "Plaintiff elected to bring his
suit in Tennessee, he brought it within the one year and kept it alive
by refiling his suit in Tennessee, so that expiration of the one year in
Alabama was immaterial and irrelevant and had no effect upon the
plaintiff's rights which he had preserved in Tennessee."42
In the Hix n case (the first of the three cases discussed herein) the
plaintiff had similarly procured a summons which was returned un-
executed and then had obtained plures summons which was served
within a year thereafter, but the federal court in this case held that
the local statute of limitations had run because service could have
been obtained under the nonresident motorist statute and that it was
not tolled by the unserved summons. No reference was made to the
statute giving an additional year for recommencement of the action.4 3
The recommencement statute was involved also in the SigZer case,
in a somewhat backhanded fashion. There, suit had been brought in
North Carolina; but when service was not obtained, the plaintiff took
a nonsuit. The North Carolina statute, like the Tennessee statute, per-
mitted refiling of the suit within a year. The suit in Tennessee was
brought within one year after the North Carolina nonsuit, but the
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-114 (1956).
39. Since the Tennessee statute was held to have run in this case, this part
of the opinion may be regarded as dictum.
40. The accident in this case happened in Alabama. Defendant was not
resident there but could have been sued there by service under the Alabama
nonresident motorist statute. He therefore contended that the action had been
barred after one year in Alabama and that under Tennessee and Alabama
authority his availability for suit there was "in effect" the same as residence
under the borrowing statute.
41. TENN. CODE Anw. §§ 28-105 to -106 (1956).
42. 292 S.W.2d at 12.
43. Tabor v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc., 196 Tenn. 198, 264 S.W.2d 821 (1953)
was cited in the Hixon case. This case had held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-105
(1956). permitting alias process or recommencing the action within one year
from the date of failure to execute the original summons did not have the
effect of modifying § 20-224 so as to extend the time during which the Secre-
tary of State had agency to accept service of process beyond the period
designated therein (one year from the date of the accident). But in the
HJIo case personal service was obtained, and the question was as to the effect
of TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-105 (1956) on § 28-304 (the one-year statute of limi-
tations for bringing a personal injury action). The Fowler case would indicate
that these two sections are to be construed together.
1000 [ VOL. 10
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court held that the North Carolina statutes were procedural in nature
and therefore had no application in Tennessee when the latter was the
foreign state. It added that the Tennessee statute must be construed
as applying only to a nonsuit to an action within the State of Ten-
nessee.
